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COSMETIC REPAIR TO A CRUMBLING 
FOUNDATION: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
OF IDAHO’S MOST RECENT INDIGENT 
DEFENSE LEGISLATION* 
He who has not first laid his foundations may be able with great 
ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble 
to the architect and danger to the building. ~Machiavelli1 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Ask any U.S. citizen to describe a right guaranteed to her by the 
Constitution, and the likely answer will be quick: freedom.2 It is the first 
thing schoolchildren learn about their country, and the only memory 
that lasts a lifetime. But even though far fewer people could name them, 
that one big right—being free—is built on a base of many smaller con-
stitutional promises. Among those structural supports is the right to 
counsel.3 
For many people, the right to be free never hinges on their right to 
counsel. But for criminal defendants, the rights are often intertwined: 
no counsel, no freedom. In those cases, what happens to the broader 
guarantee if there are cracks in the smaller, foundational right? Unfor-
tunately, indigent defendants in Idaho are finding out. 
Near the Clerk’s window in one Idaho courthouse hangs a sign 
warning defendants, in bold type, that the services of its attorneys are 
“NOT FREE!”4 While the sign means to describe the potential monetary 
cost of having appointed counsel, it could just as easily be describing the 
fate of most low-income defendants, who generally cannot afford proper 
representation. Without the means to pay a lawyer—even a reduced-
cost public defender—indigent defendants often find themselves navi-
gating a complicated legal system alone.  
                                                       
 2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (noting that the Constitution exists to “secure the 
Blessings of Liberty” for U.S. citizens). 
 3. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 4. See generally Richard J. Wilson, Compelling Indigent Defendants to Pay the 
Cost of Counsel Adds Up to Bad Policy, Bad Law, 3 CRIM. JUST. 16 (1988). The sign, which 
really did exist, read in its entirety: “If you apply for a Public Defender and the service is 
granted to you IT IS NOT FREE! You may be required to reimburse Nez Perce County.” The 
sign no longer hangs near the clerk’s window. However, indigent defendants in Nez Perce 
County are still warned that they may have to pay for the right to receive an attorney. On 
the application for a public defender, the defendant is warned, in all capital letters right 
above the signature line: “I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE THAT I MAY BE REQUIRED TO 
REIMBURSE NEZ PERCE COUNTY FOR THE SERVICES OF THE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER.” Affidavit of Financial Status, Application for Public Defender, and Order, Nez 
Perce County (Oct. 2013) (blank application form) (on file with author). For the reader’s con-
venience, a copy of the Nez Perce County public defender application form is included as 
Appendix A.  
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That is a problem of constitutional magnitude. As the U.S. Su-
preme Court has made clear, a person’s right to an attorney does not 
depend on his ability to pay for one.5 But most indigent defendants do 
not understand that they can be required to pay, if anything, only what 
they can actually afford. Thus, because someone in an Idaho courthouse 
chose to hang a sign that improperly informs defendants of the scope of 
their right to counsel, those defendants could very well end up not free. 
Although that sign is one of the most colorful examples of the prob-
lems within Idaho’s current indigent public defense system, it is far 
from the only one.6 Indigent defendants in Idaho suffer the consequenc-
                                                       
 5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) 
(noting that the “noble ideal” that “every defendant stands equal before the law . . . cannot be 
realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to as-
sist him”). Some states have adopted indigent-defense cost recovery, on the theory that it can 
be psychologically beneficial for a near-indigent defendant to help with the cost of his de-
fense. See generally Wilson, supra note 4.  
 6. For example, on June 17, 2015, class action litigation against the State (dis-
cussed in Part IV.A, infra) was filed on behalf of four named indigent defendants and other 
similarly situated defendants who have not received constitutionally adequate counsel. Class 




  These four, more recent—but equally egregious—examples of Idaho’s constitu-
tional indigent defense failures show that Idaho’s most recent legislation (discussed in Part 
III.C, infra) has done little to improve the state of indigent defense since the Defender’s As-
sociation’s grim report in 2010: 
  Officers arrested Tracy Tucker in Bonner County on March 6, 2015. Id. at 3. No 
attorney represented Tucker at his first appearance where the judge set bail at $40,000. Id. 
at 4. Tucker was unable to make bail or make any arguments as to why bail should be re-
duced. Id. Thus, Tucker remained in jail for three months. Id. Over the course of those three 
months, Tucker met with his attorney for a total of twenty minutes over three meetings of 
which two were at Tucker’s court appearances. Id. Tucker tried to contact his attorney by 
phone over fifty times but was unable to reach his attorney. Id. Tucker’s attorney was so 
overburdened that even ten days before Tucker’s trial date, he had not done any meaningful 
discovery or investigation. Id. Tucker faced up to fifteen years in prison after he pled guilty 
to attempted strangulation. Id. 
  Similarly, “officers arrested Jason Sharp in Shoshone County [o]n May 16, 2014 
pursuant to a warrant charging burglary and grand theft.” Id. Sharp also was not assigned 
counsel during his first appearance and bail was set at $50,000. Id. Unlike Tucker, however, 
Sharp was able to convince the court to release him so he would not lose his job. Id. at 4–5. In 
the year after his release, Sharp was unable to communicate effectively with his attorney. Id. 
at 5. His attorney did not provide him, even after he requested it, with discovery materials 
relating to the state’s evidence against him. Id. Sharp’s attorney did not file any substantive 
motions, like suppression motions, on Sharp’s behalf except for motions to continue his trial. 
Id. Sharp faced up to thirty years in prison if convicted. Id.  
  Named Plaintiff Naomi Morley was arrested for DUI and possession of con-
trolled substance on March 14, 2014 in Ada County after she was involved in a car accident. 
Id. Morley’s bail was set at $15,000, which she could not afford and she remained in jail for 
three weeks despite her serious injuries caused by the accident. Id. at 5–6. Morley’s attorney 
told her that if she wanted experts to challenge the state’s evidence, she would have to pay 
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es of altogether inconsistent, county-implemented systems that are fail-
ing to provide even the bare minimums of the constitutional right to 
counsel. Idaho is in desperate need of indigent defense reform. 
After the National Legal Aid & Defender Association (Defender As-
sociation) released a report about the dismal state of Idaho indigent de-
fense services in 2010,7 the Idaho Legislature has glacially and incom-
pletely moved toward reform. In the last eighteen months, the Legisla-
ture has taken two steps forward,8 but neither of those has addressed 
the underlying structural problems Idaho faces.9 Instead, the recent 
measures are nothing more than a new coat of paint on a crumbling 
foundation. 
Idaho is at a critical juncture, and has to choose: should it continue 
to gloss over precarious and systemic flaws, or should it take its public 
defense delivery method down to the studs and rebuild? This Article 
suggests that now is the time for Idaho to construct a more sustainable 
system for delivering indigent defense services.  
To give Idaho a head start in doing so, Part II of this Article de-
scribes the attributes of a good public defense system, including the con-
                                                                                                                                
for them herself. Id. at 6. Without the help of her attorney, Morley herself obtained a sworn 
affidavit from the person acknowledging responsibility. Id. Morley’s attorney was so over-
burdened that he had no time to review Morley’s extensive notes on the police reports and 
did not investigate the vehicle before the state destroyed it (and the evidence it contained). 
Id. Morley believed her attorney was pressuring her into a plea agreement due to lack of 
resources and time to prepare for trial. Id. Instead of taking a plea deal for ten years in pris-
on, Morley faced up to fifteen years in prison if convicted at her trial. Id.  
  Jeremy Payne spent five months in jail after officials arrested him for posses-
sion of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia. Id. Payne was unable to afford bail, 
which was set at $30,000, but was released from jail after the State failed to bring a timely 
trial. Id. at 6–7. Even though Payne was assigned a public defender, he went unrepresented 
at his first appearance. Id. at 6. Additionally, while he was in jail, Payne was unable to 
communicate with his attorney. Id. at 7. Payne’s meetings with his attorney at the jail and in 
court, immediately before court appearances, were always extremely brief, totaling between 
thirty and forty-five minutes since Payne was arrested. Id. Payne’s trial was continued three 
times and he faced seven years in prison if convicted at trial. Id. 
  On January 22, 2016, the Idaho district court judge presiding over the case 
dismissed the ACLU’s lawsuit stating that the lawsuit “invites the court to make speculative 
assumptions regarding the outcomes of individual cases” and presume “that all indigent 
criminal defendants in all counties are recieiving the same ineffective assistance of counsel.” 
Kimberlee Kruesi, Idaho Judge Dismisses ACLU Lawsuit Over Public Defense, WASHINGTON 
TIMES (Jan. 22, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jan/22/judge-dismisses-
aclu-public-defense-lawsuit/. The judge did, however, agree that Idaho’s indigent defense 
system is problematic. Id. Unsurprisingly, the ACLU appealed the ruling. Betsy Z. Russell, 
ACLU Appeals Dismissal of Public Defense Lawsuit, SPOKESMAN.COM (Jan. 25, 2016), 
http://www.spokesman.com/blogs/boise/2016/jan/25/aclu-appeals-dismissal-public-defense-
lawsuit/. 
 7. See generally Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, The Guarantee of Counsel: Ad-
vocacy & Due Process in Idaho’s Trial Courts, BOISE WEEKLY (Jan. 2010), 
http://www.boiseweekly.com/pdf/idaho_report.pdf [hereinafter NLADA]. 
 8. IDAHO CODE §19-850 (2015); IDAHO CODE §19-859 (2015). 
 9. David Carroll, Idaho Governor Signs Public Defense Commission Bill Into Law, 
SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (April 1, 2014), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-governor-signs-
public-defense-commission-bill-into-law/. 
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stitutional right to counsel and the different models of indigent defense 
delivery available to states and local governments. Part III focuses on 
the current methods of indigent defense delivery services being used in 
Idaho, the inherent problems with those systems, and the recent legisla-
tive action aimed at fixing those problems. It argues that both statutes 
are inadequate to produce sustainable reform in Idaho. Finally, Part IV 
illustrates the real damage Idaho faces due to pending litigation, which 
resulted from failing to achieve reform, and suggests that State over-
sight is the best solution for Idaho’s failing system. It proposes that Ida-
ho should take over responsibility for providing constitutionally man-
dated counsel using county-operated, dedicated public defense offices.  
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A GOOD INDIGENT DEFENSE 
SYSTEM 
Forty years before the U.S. Supreme Court decided this issue in 
1963, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that: 
It is the public policy of this state, disclosed by constitutional 
guarantees as well as by numerous provisions of the statutes, to 
accord to every person accused of a crime, not only a fair and 
impartial trial, but every reasonable opportunity to prepare his 
defense and to vindicate his innocence upon a trial. In a case of 
indigent persons accused of crime, the court must assign counsel 
to the defense at public expense.10 
Thus, even before the U.S. Supreme Court took on the issue, Idaho 
understood the important public policy of providing legal defense ser-
vices to its poor.11  
While the Idaho Supreme Court’s words are powerful, this im-
portant public policy is unrecognizable in the State today.12 It is uniden-
tifiable because Idaho is one out of only three states that provides no 
state-level financial support for its indigent defense services.13 And be-
cause Idaho has abandoned this important public policy by not imple-
menting state-supported public defense, it continually fails to meet 
foundational right to counsel minimums. 
                                                       
 10. State v. Montroy, 217 P. 611, 614, 37 Idaho 684, 690 (1923). 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Idaho Project Page, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER, 
http://sixthamendment.org/what-we-do/our-current-projects/idaho-project-page/ (last visited 
Mar. 3, 2016). 
 13. Id.; Morgan Boydston, Idaho, ACLU Go to Court Over Public Defense System, 
KTVB.COM (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.ktvb.com/story/news/local/2015/12/17/judge-hears- ar-
guments-in-public-defense-case-against-state/77463752/. Idaho does not provide any state-
level financing for trial-level, non-capital indigent defense. See Idaho Project Page, supra 
note 12. 
674 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
A. The Constitutional Right to Counsel 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures 
that defendants are afforded the assistance of counsel in all criminal 
prosecutions.14 And the Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment––making 
the Sixth Amendment applicable to the States––ensures that all de-
fendants are guaranteed that right.15  
The Supreme Court famously interpreted the Sixth Amendment 
when it decided Gideon v. Wainwright16 in 1963. In Gideon, Florida 
charged the defendant, Gideon, with breaking and entering with intent 
to commit a misdemeanor, a felony in Florida.17 Gideon asked the Flori-
da trial court to appoint him a lawyer.18 The trial court stated it could 
not appoint counsel because Florida did not charge Gideon with a capi-
tal offense––a requirement for appointment of counsel.19 On appeal, the 
U.S. Supreme Court reasoned that not only did precedent require it to 
find that indigent defendants are entitled to the right to counsel but also 
that “reason and reflection require us to recognize that in our adversary 
system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor 
to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided 
for him. This seems to us to be an obvious truth.”20 A concurring Justice 
noted “[t]hat the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel in 
‘all criminal prosecutions’ is clear, both from the language of the 
Amendment and from this Court’s interpretation”21 and went on to say 
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to assistance of counsel provision does 
not distinguish between capital cases and non-capital cases.22 
In Gideon, the Court made it clear that––through the Fourteenth 
Amendment––each state is responsible for implementing the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee of counsel and for delivering the assistance of 
counsel to its indigent defendants.23 The state itself is ultimately re-
sponsible.24 If a state chooses to delegate this responsibility to its coun-
ties or local governments, the state is not then relieved of its obliga-
tion.25 States must ensure that its counties and local governments are 
providing the minimum constitutionally required indigent defense ser-
vices and must intervene if those systems are failing.26 Thus, if the local-
                                                       
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 15. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. 
 16. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963). 
 17. Id. at 336. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 344. 
 21. Id. at 348 (1963) (Clark, J., concurring). 
 22. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 349. 
 23. NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
 24. NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
 25. NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
 26. NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
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ly implemented indigent defense delivery systems are collapsing, re-
sponsibility reverts to the state.27 
Idaho has chosen to delegate its constitutional responsibility to 
counties and has left it up to each county to determine the method of 
supplying indigent defense services.28 This county-specific patchwork-
quilt of systems contributes to Idaho’s crumbling indigent defense foun-
dation. 
B. Three Types of Indigent Defense Delivery Systems 
States (and local governments) have choices when determining how 
to provide public defender services to its indigent citizens: a state can 
choose to regulate indigent defense services at the state level or pass its 
responsibilities on to local governments.29 Delivering indigent defense 
services is the state’s responsibility according to the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Gideon.30 In attending to its responsibility, a state—or 
local government entity if the state chooses to shift its responsibility—
can deliver indigent defense services in three typical ways: 1) through a 
dedicated public defender office, 2) through a contract system, or 3) 
through an assigned counsel system.31  
1. Dedicated Public Defender Office System 
If a state or local government chooses the first model, it means that 
there will be a dedicated public defender’s office.32 These offices are typi-
cally situated near the courthouse and are usually staffed with attor-
neys, support staff, and––in larger offices––with social workers and in-
vestigators.33 All hired parties are government employees and are paid 
by the state.34  
                                                       
 27. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
 28. See generally NLADA, supra note 7, at 1.  
 29. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 2. 
 30. See supra Part II.A. 
 31. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 14. However, Idaho has a few counties that choose 
none of the three systems listed. Those counties are discussed in detail below. See also Scott 
Wallace & David Carroll, The Implementation and Impact of Indigent Defense Standards, 31 
S. U. L. Rev. 245, 249 (2004). 
 32. Wisconsin uses this model and operates a main dedicated public defender 
branch office in Madison. Wisconsin has also established branch locations throughout the 
state to deliver indigent defense services. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 33. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 34. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
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Even though the dedicated public defender office model is the opti-
mal system because it best protects indigent defendant rights and public 
defense standards, dedicated offices are expensive to operate.35  
A state or local government may not have the resources or the cli-
ents to warrant a dedicated office.36 If lack of resources or client base is 
a problem, States or local governments may decide to implement anoth-
er less expensive system such as the contract system or assigned counsel 
system.37 
2. The Contract System 
Sometimes states or local governments choose the second model––
the contract system.38 In the contract model, a state or county contracts 
with a law firm, a non-profit organization, or individual attorneys to 
handle a certain type of case or a certain number of cases.39 The individ-
ual attorney or office is paid a contractually agreed rate to deliver all 
indigent defense services.40  
Some of the features of this model include contracts that are ad-
ministered by an independent oversight commission and include strict 
caseload controls, training, and extra funding for investigators and ex-
perts.41 Even though this system is an effective delivery system,42 other 
states and local governments have decided that neither the dedicated 
office nor contract system is right for its citizens and have implemented 
the assigned counsel system as a way to provide indigent defense ser-
vices. 
3. Assigned Counsel System 
The assigned counsel system, the third model, allows attorneys to 
agree to have their names placed on an assigned counsel roster that 
judges use to assign attorneys to indigent defendants on an as-needed 
                                                       






 36. See id. 
 37. See infra Part II.B.2 & II.B.3. 
 38. Oregon uses this contract model and delivers defense services through a mix-
ture of private attorney contracts and non-profit organization contracts. The contractors 
provide indigent defense representation at the county level. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 39. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 40. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 41. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 42. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
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basis.43 Judges rotate the attorneys on the roster and the attorneys are 
paid by the hour or by the case.44 
A state using this assigned counsel system provides direct supervi-
sion at the local level to ensure compliance with national and state 
standards.45 If the assigned attorneys are paid an hourly rate, in this 
system, the hourly rate can incrementally increase based on factors such 
as attorney caseload and specific case complexity.46 
Of course, the available indigent defense delivery models are three 
common ways in which States and local governments can provide these 
services. But indigent defense delivery systems must also be guided by 
structural and individualized representation standards.  
C. National Indigent Defense Delivery Standards 
National associations like the Defender Association and the Ameri-
can Bar Association (ABA) have developed standards for adequate indi-
gent defense standards.47 These types of associations play leadership 
roles in developing standards for indigent defense systems and indigent 
defense representation.48 These standards are not binding on the states 
or local governments, but they do guide policy makers as they enact ju-
risdiction-specific indigent defense statutes.49 
1. A Brief History of the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense 
Delivery System 
Before the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery Sys-
tem (principles) were developed and adopted in 2002, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice compiled national guiding standards in a five-volume 
work.50 These standards were available to attorneys, policy-makers, and 
public defense leaders.51 However, the standards needed to be revised, 
updated, and distilled to better reflect the problems affecting indigent 
defense services and to help guide policymakers in a more succinct 
way.52 
                                                       
 43. Massachusetts uses the assigned counsel system. The state utilizes an inde-
pendent indigent defense commission in Boston. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 44. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 45. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 46. NLADA, supra note 7, at 14.  
 47. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252. 
 48. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252. 
 49. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 253.  
 50. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252. 
 51. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252. 
 52. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 252. 
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The principles’ purpose is to distill the voluminous national stand-
ards for indigent defense systems down to their most basic elements.53 
The principles are based on papers written by major players in the indi-
gent defense arena.54 Those papers referenced all the then-present na-
tional indigent defense delivery standards, which contained over three 
decades of black-letter principles.55 Because there were three decades of 
black-letter principles available, officials and policy makers needed a 
succinct, easily reviewed and applied compilation.56  
The principles are a reference point for discussion of the ten most 
important areas of indigent defense standards.57 The ABA House of Del-
egates recommends that jurisdictions use the principles as an easy way 
to assess the needs of its public defense delivery system and then com-
municate those needs to the policymakers who are responsible for de-
signing public defense delivery systems.58 The principles help guide gov-
ernment officials and policy makers when designing indigent defense 
systems that provide effective and efficient representation for indigent 
defendants.59 Since their adoption, the principles have been instrumen-
tal in states’ efforts to improve public defense systems.60 
2. The Ten ABA Principles Examined 
Each of the ABA’s ten principles are interdependent and an indi-
gent defense system cannot be critiqued by averaging the performance 
under each principle.61 For example, a jurisdiction cannot simply meet 
seven out of the ten principles and then conclude that it is meeting the 
needs of indigent defendants.62 The defense delivery system used must 
meet performance standards under each one of the principles for the 
jurisdiction to conclude that the system is meeting constitutional mini-
mums.63 Close is not good enough.  
                                                       
 53. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 258–59. 
 54. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259 n.21. 
 55. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259 n.21. 
 56. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259. 
 57. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 259. 
 58. Terry Brooks & Shubhangi Deoras, ABA’s Principles of Public Defense, 17-SUM 
CRIM. JUST. 68, 68 (2002). 
 59. See generally American Bar Association, ABA, Ten Principles of a Public De-
fense Delivery System (Feb. 2002), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Ten Principles]. 
 60. Brooks & Deoras, supra note 58, at 68–69 (discussing the use of the principles 
in Texas, Montana, Georgia, and Michigan). 
 61. NLADA, supra note 7, at 6. 
 62. See generally NLADA, supra note 7, at 6. 
 63. NLADA, supra note 7, at 6.  
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The public defense function, including the selection, 
funding, and payment of defense counsel, is independent. 
~ ABA Principle 164 
Principle 1 requires that indigent defense system be free from polit-
ical influence, judiciary oversight, and be maintained by a non-partisan 
commission.65 Principle 1 also suggests that the chief defender and staff 
defenders should be awarded the positions based on merit and should 
involve goals of diversity recruitment in staff.66 A public defense system 
must be free from political attacks in order for it to achieve ethical client 
representation goals.67 This principle is especially important when a 
state or local government uses a dedicated public defender office.68 
Where a chief public defender is appointed by a government official, po-
litical influence concerns increase because the focus is on influencing 
appointment decisions and not indigent defendants.69  
Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public de-
fense delivery system consists of both a defender office 
and the active participation of the private bar. ~ ABA 
Principle 270 
Principle 2 allows for the state bar’s participation when caseloads 
exceed expectations, meaning that a state bar association may alleviate 
defender workload by appointing part-time defenders, contracting for 
services, or by implementing a controlled assigned counsel procedure.71 
Excessive workloads are a contributing factor in poor indigent defense 
systems because, if attorneys are facing excessive workloads, it means 
that they do not have adequate time to spend with each client.72 Involv-
ing the private bar when caseloads become overwhelming helps public 
defenders diligently represent their clients.73 
                                                       
 64. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
 65. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
 66. See Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.  
 67. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 260.  
 68. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 260.  
 69. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 261.  
 70. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
 71. Id. at 2. 
 72. See The Constitution Project, Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of 
Our Constitutional Right to Counsel, Report of the National Right to Counsel Committee, 66 
(2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [hereinafter 
Justice Denied]; see also NLADA, supra note 7, at 6. 
 73. See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants, 
Eight Guidelines of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads (August 2009), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/
ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Eight 
Guidelines]; American Council of Chief Defenders Statement on Caseloads and Workloads, 
American Council of Chief Defenders, National Legal Aid & Defender Association (August 
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Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is 
assigned and notified of appointment, as soon as feasible 
after clients’ arrest, detention, or request for counsel. ~ 
ABA Principle 374 
The ABA’s principle 3 addresses the need for early eligibility 
screening and counsel appointment.75 Eligibility screening needs to be 
uniform and needs to treat defendants with limited resources equally.76 
Counsel needs to be provided for the defendant within twenty-four 
hours after he is arrested, detained, or requests counsel.77 Appointing 
counsel to defendants early in the adjudicatory process helps ensure 
that defendant’s rights are protected because counsel is there to help 
explain and safeguard the defendant’s legal rights.78 
Defense counsel is provided sufficient time and confiden-
tial space within which to meet with clients. ~ ABA Princi-
ple 479 
Principle 4 ensures attorneys are provided with confidential meet-
ing spaces so that the attorney’s client feels free to openly discuss his 
case with his attorney.80 This requires private meeting spaces in jails, 
prisons, and courthouses.81 The availability of private meeting spaces 
ensures that the attorney’s professional ethical obligations are protected 
and preserves attorney-client confidential information.82 After all, where 
life and liberty are at stake, it is important that a client trust his public 
defender and it is hard for him to build that trust with his defender if 
the communications are not private.83 
Defense counsel’s workload is controlled to permit the 
rendering of quality representation. ~ ABA Principle 584 
Principle 5 requires caseload control.85 An attorney’s workload 
should never be so high that counsel would be forced to breach ethical 
obligations, nor should it be so high that it interferes with counsel’s abil-
ity to provide quality representation.86 An attorney who tries to repre-
                                                                                                                                
24, 2007), 
http://www.nlada.org/DMS/Documents/1189179200.71/EDITEDFINALVERSIONACCDCAS
ELOADSTATEMENTsept6.pdf [hereinafter ACCD]. 
 74. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 265.  
 77. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id.  
 80. See id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 267.  
 83. See id. 
 84. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 2.  
 85. Id.  
 86. Id.  
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sent too many clients is limited in the number of hours she can spend 
with each client, thus the defense she presents on behalf of her client 
suffers.87 A jurisdiction that allows the attorney to carry private cases in 
addition to her public defender workload must make sure that the at-
torney’s entire workload is considered for caseload maximums.88 If there 
is ever a point in which counsel feels that her workload is too over-
whelming, counsel is obligated to decline further appointment of indi-
gent defendants or take on more cases.89 Particularly, contract defenders 
should have a release valve for excess caseloads or overly complex cas-
es.90  
Several organizations provide guidance on public defender caseload 
limits and benchmarks.91 These types of caseload limit guidelines set a 
maximum number for the specific types of cases attorneys should be 
handling on a yearly basis.92 For example, the American Counsel of 
Chief Defenders suggests that a single felony attorney should not take 
on more than 150 felony cases per year.93 
Defense counsel’s ability, training, and experience match 
the complexity of the case. ~ ABA Principle 694 
For this principle, it is the appointed counsel’s responsibility to re-
fuse assignment of a case if he lacks the experience or training needed 
to provide ethical, high quality representation.95 This principle is usual-
ly implemented by classifying attorneys according to their training and 
experience.96 For example, death penalty cases are unique and complex 
therefore they require special attorney qualifications.97 
 
 
                                                       
 87. See id.  
 88. See id.  
 89. Id. at 1. 
 90. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3. 
 91. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, supra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73. 
 92. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, supra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73. 
 93. A misdemeanor attorney should not take more than 400 non-traffic misde-
meanors per year; a juvenile attorney should not take on more than 200 juvenile cases per 
year; a civil commitments attorney should not take on more than 200 mental health cases 
per year; and an appellate attorney should not take on more than 25 non-capital appeals per 
year. National caseload standards should never be exceeded. See, e.g., Eight Guidelines, su-
pra note 73; ACCD, supra note 73. 
 94. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3. 
 95. Id.   
 96. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 263. 
 97. Id. at 264. 
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The same attorney continuously represents the client un-
til completion of the case. ~ ABA Principle 798 
Principle 7 recommends vertical representation––where the same 
attorney represents the client from the beginning of the case through 
the trial’s completion and sentencing.99 Vertical representation does not 
necessarily extend through all appeals because in an appeal, the client 
should be assigned an attorney who has appellate expertise.100 But the 
assigned appellate attorney should represent the client until the direct 
appeal’s completion.101  
While horizontal representation—where one attorney sees all cli-
ents in a particular stage of the process before passing the client on to 
the attorney responsible for the next stage—is a mechanism used to 
save time and money, it inhibits the establishment of the attorney-client 
relationship.102 Vertical representation helps to solidify the relationship 
plus helps to build trust between client and attorney.103 
There is parity between defense counsel and the prosecu-
tion with respect to resources and defense counsel is in-
cluded as an equal partner in the justice system. ~ ABA 
Principle 8104 
Principle 8 requires that the financial resources available to indi-
gent defense attorneys should match those available to the prosecu-
tion.105 Defense attorneys and prosecutors should receive equal treat-
ment in areas such as access to support staff, investigators, experts, and 
personal benefits.106 And contract based defense attorneys should never 
be selected primarily on the basis of lowest fee.107 This treatment en-
sures that indigent defendants are afforded the ability to present a de-
fense proportional to the prosecution’s case.108 Public defenders should 
have the same amount of resources that are provided to the prosecution; 
they should be equal.109 
                                                       
 98. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
100. Id.  
101. Id.  
102. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 263. 
103. See id. 
104. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
105. Id. at 3. In Idaho, in 2014, the amount spent on public defense throughout the 
counties was $14,001,709 whereas the counties collectively spent $21,924,407 on prosecuting 
attorney services. These numbers suggest that there was not parity between the prosecutori-
al and defense functions. Jared Hoskins, LSO PACKET FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER INTERIM 
COMMITTEE MEETING (on file with author). 
106. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3. 
107. Id. 
108. See generally id. This principle assumes that the prosecutor in a particular ju-
risdiction is adequately funded and well supported. 
109. Id. 
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Defense counsel is provided with and required to attend 
continuing legal education. ~ ABA Principle 9110 
Defense attorneys and support staff should be provided with sys-
tematic and comprehensive training in their practice area.111 And, in 
harmony with Principle 8, the education should be equal to what the 
prosecutor receives.112 This principle is the first to endorse a require-
ment of mandatory continuing legal education for public defense attor-
neys.113 
Defense counsel is supervised and systematically re-
viewed for quality and efficiency according to nationally 
and locally adopted standards. ~ ABA Principle 10114 
Principle 10 requires that defense attorneys be supervised and re-
viewed on a periodic basis.115 In addition to public defenders, support 
staff should be evaluated from time to time to ensure quality represen-
tation and competence.116 More specifically, attorneys should be evalu-
ated against performance standards, which prescribe basic duties the 
attorney is expected to perform during all litigation stages.117 
Many states, local governments, and professional organizations 
throughout the country use the principles as a “best practices” tool to 
guide public defenders or model their own legislation after the princi-
ples.118 The ABA principles serve as the structural framework needed to 
build a sturdy foundation of a public defense delivery system. States or 
local governments can use the principles to construct a constitutionally 





                                                       
110. Id. at 1. 
111. Id. at 3. 
112. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 3. 
113. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 264. 
114. Ten Principles, supra note 59, at 1. 
115. Id.  
116. Id. at 3. 
117. Wallace & Carroll, supra note 31, at 268. 
118. See, e.g., Policy and Leadership, PHILADELPHIA BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/ResJune11_2?appNum=4 (last visited January 24, 
2015) (presenting a Resolution of the Philadelphia Bar Association Adopting and Endorsing 
the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Delivery System); Guidelines on 
Indigent Defense Services Delivery Systems, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA (2006), 
http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=fwTzyTmupEY%3D&tabid=2326 (last 
visited January 24, 2015). 
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III. IDAHO’S CRUMBLING INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEM 
Currently, 30 states have relieved counties of the burden of funding 
indigent-defense counsel, but not every state chooses to adopt a state-
operated indigent defense delivery system.119 In fact, Idaho has not re-
lieved its local government of indigent defense responsibilities.120 In-
stead, Idaho continues to delegate the responsibility of indigent defense 
to its counties.121 But, as in other states that have delegated indigent 
defense responsibilities to local government, Idaho’s local government-
based systems are inherently flawed and structurally unsound.122  
When counties (or local governments) fund indigent defense, there 
are inevitable inequities from county-to-county.123 Inescapably, urban 
counties will have more cases than rural counties, which overburdens 
attorneys and strains resources.124 Additionally, rural counties are left 
with fewer resources and can be financially crippled by even a single 
murder case, or––as is the case in some rural Idaho counties––the coun-
ty often has a fewer number of attorneys so they can quickly become 
overburdened if the caseload increases just slightly.125 Idaho’s system 
suffers from these types of defects and indigent defendants suffer the 
consequences of the crumbling system. 
A. How the Current Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho Are Working 
Idaho’s current indigent defense system is codified in the Idaho 
Code as the Idaho Public Defense Act.126 Other than appellate indigent 
defense––which is an Executive Branch agency and operated at the 
state level––Idaho’s indigent defense obligation is delegated to each in-
dividual county.127 Even though there are three traditional ways to de-
livery indigent defense,128 the Idaho legislature chose not to codify the 
assigned counsel system.129 Additionally, the Idaho Legislature created 
an extra approach under both the dedicated public defender office model 
and the contract system resulting in four methods available to Idaho 
counties.  
By statute, each county can implement one of four systems for 
providing indigent defense services.130 Counties can choose from one of 
these four approved methods: (1) a county can establish and maintain a 
                                                       
119. NLADA, supra note 7, at 2.  
120. See id. at 2–3. 
121. See id. 
122. See Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 55.  
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. See Justice Denied, supra note 72, at 55. 
126. IDAHO CODE §§ 19-848–866 (2014). 
127. Idaho Project Page, supra note 12. 
128. See supra Part II.B. 
129. IDAHO CODE  § 19-859(1)–(4) (2014). 
130. Id. 
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dedicated public defender office, (2) a county can jointly establish and 
operate a dedicated public defender office, (3) a county can contract with 
another county’s office for services, or (4) a county can contract with a 
private attorney.131  
Seven Idaho counties have decided to implement the first option in 
Idaho–– establish and maintain a dedicated public defender office.132 
Currently, there are two counties in Idaho that have opted for the se-
cond choice and have entered into an agreement with a neighboring 
county to establish a joint public defender’s office.133 But no counties in 
Idaho have implemented the third delivery option; thus, no county con-
tracts with an outside public defender office.134 And last, thirty-four 
counties in Idaho have chosen the fourth option and currently contract 
with private attorneys for the delivery of indigent defense services.135  
Despite the four statutory systems available to Idaho counties, 
some counties chose not to implement any of the available methods and 
chose to create their own delivery system.136 This “we do what we want” 
approach creates a chaotic patchwork of implemented systems in Idaho.  
In 2010, the Defender Association––which frequently evaluates in-
digent defense delivery systems throughout the country––produced its 
evaluation of indigent defense systems in Idaho.137 The evaluation’s re-
sults were grim.138 No counties evaluated in Idaho had indigent defense 
delivery systems that were constitutionally adequate.139 More specifical-
ly, the Defender Association concluded “the state of Idaho fails to pro-
vide the level of representation required by our Constitution for those 
who cannot afford counsel in its criminal and juvenile courts.”140 Thus, 
indigent defendants suffer because of Idaho’s constitutionally inade-
quate systems. 
                                                       
131. Id. 
132. Ian H. Thomson, Report to the Legislature, IDAHO STATE PUBLIC DEFENSE 
COMM’N, 5 (2015) (on file with author); Complaint, supra note 6, at 18. 
133. Thomson, supra note 132, at 6. 
134. See generally id. 
135. Id. at 6. 
136. See Complaint, supra note 6, at 18. 
137. See generally NLADA, supra note 7; NLADA Publications & Reports, NAT’L 
LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, http://nlada.net/publications-reports (last visited Feb. 9, 
2016). 
138. Idaho Report, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N, 
http://www.nlada100years.org/node/5245  (last visited Feb. 9, 2016). 
139. Id. 
140. NLADA, supra note 7, at 2. Much of the information used in this article is based 
on the Defender Association’s study conducted in 2010. Consequently, the information is out 
of date, but it is the best data available in Idaho with little exception. Additionally, the report 
only covers a sampling of Idaho’s forty-four counties. When available, this article will provide 
updated information and will supplement with county information not included in the De-
fender Association’s report. 
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1. Counties with Dedicated Public Defender Offices 
Today, Idaho has seven counties that have dedicated public defend-
er offices.141 These offices employ 115 full time public defenders and an-
other forty-one conflict defenders.142  
In Bonneville County, at the time of the report, indigent defense 
services were provided through a small public defender office that 
housed five attorneys including the chief public defender.143 All conflict 
cases were contracted to an attorney who, in turn, subcontracted cases 
to two additional attorneys.144 The County commissioners selected all 
the public defenders and the conflict attorney; and the commissioners 
determined the amount of funding that should be allocated to indigent 
defense, including payment to the conflict attorney.145  
Additionally, the Bonneville public defenders were allowed to have 
private practices in addition to their indigent defense duties.146 With one 
of the five attorneys handling 1,154 misdemeanors at the time of the 
evaluation––nearly three times the national recommended amount––it 
is likely that a single private practice case will significantly interfere 
with a defender’s indigent defense duties because there will be less time 
available for the attorney’s indigent defense clients.147 Or there will be 
an incentive for the attorney to spend more time on cases where he is 
paid a higher hourly rate.148 
Bonneville County public defenders were well aware of the impact 
their extremely high caseloads had on the quality of representation.149 
The single attorney handling all misdemeanor cases estimated that he 
was only able to spend about one hour on each case.150 Additionally, 
there were three district judges in Bonneville County, and the attorneys 
from the public defender’s office were assigned to argue all of their cases 
in front of one particular judge.151  
                                                       
141. Thomson, supra note 132, at 5. These counties include: Ada, Bannock, Bonner, 
Bonneville, Canyon, Kootenai, and Twin Falls. Id. 
142. Id. at 6.   
143. NLADA, supra note 7, at 19. In 2014, Bonneville County created a separate Of-
fice of the Conflict Public Defender. This office employs two attorneys who handle conflict 
cases. Thomson, supra note 132, at 5 n.3. 
144. NLADA, supra note 7 at 19, 22. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
Rule 1.7, states “a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation involves a concur-
rent conflict of interest.” Defined conflicts of interest include: the representation of one client 
will be directly adverse to another client or representation of one or more clients will limit 
the lawyer’s obligations to another client. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, r. 1.7(a) (AM. 
BAR ASS’N 1983). 
145. NLADA, supra note 7, at 19.  
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 20. 
148. Id.  
149. Id.  
150. Id. at 19. 
151. NLADA, supra note 7, at 21. 
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This system presented many risks, including harm to the client.152 
For example, the attorney may have a desire to keep the judge happy by 
keeping dockets moving and this will lead to focusing on the judge’s 
preferences rather than advocating for the client and the client’s 
needs.153 Overall, the Bonneville County public defender’s office lacked 
the necessary resources to provide adequate representation to its indi-
gent clients, thus, chilling the right to counsel.154 
In Ada County, on the other hand, the chief public defender had 
been in his position for over twenty-three years and was applauded for 
his dedication to his staff and continuing independence in operation.155 
However, despite the chief defender’s leadership, the overall office work-
loads were too large to be manageable.156 For example, in 2007, the of-
fice’s felony caseload reached 2,750 cases.157 At that time, there were 
twelve felony attorneys meaning that each felony attorney averaged just 
over 229 cases per attorney.158 And the misdemeanor attorneys were 
even more overwhelmed than the felony attorneys taking on a stagger-
ing 700–800 cases per year, nearly double the national standard for 
misdemeanor attorneys.159  
Kootenai County had the most client-centered approach to indigent 
defense representation out of all the counties visited.160 In Kootenai 
County, the County commissioners directly appoint the chief public de-
fender and, at the time of the investigation, the current chief public de-
fender had been in office since the late 1980s.161 The chief public defend-
er was proud of his attorney’s zealous representation of criminal de-
fendants and the office’s litigious nature.162 However, because of this 
stance, it was well known that the public defender’s office and the pros-
ecutor’s office had a contentious relationship.163 The office had adequate 
                                                       
152. See id. at 19. 
153. Id. at 21.  
154. Id. at 20, 22. 
155. Id. at 26. 
156. Id. at 27.  
157. NLADA, supra note 7, at 27. 
158. See id. at 28. Two hundred and twenty-nine or more cases per year meant that 
each attorney was able to spend about two hours on each case no matter the case’s serious-
ness. Id. 
159. See id. A recent analysis revealed that at least six counties in Idaho have public 
defenders that are handling more than double the amount of work any one attorney should 
take on. Complaint, supra note 6, at 10. And, “[b]ased on recent court observations, public 
defenders in Kootenai, Nez Perce, Payette, Bannock, and Bonnevile counties, among others, 
have so many cases assigned to them that they are unable to even identify their clients until 
minutes before the defendants’ court appearances.” Complaint, supra note 6, at 39.  
160. NLADA, supra note 7, at 35. 
161. Id.  
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 35. 
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support staff and was well managed, but the caseloads of each individu-
al attorney were well above the national standards as they are in most 
counties throughout Idaho.164 For example, one attorney in Kootenai 
County handled 155 felony cases, which is right at the maximum rec-
ommended number of cases for a felony attorney, but the same attorney 
also handled 63 misdemeanor cases, a juvenile delinquency case, and 
five civil commitment cases.165 
Public defenders in Kootenai County also faced egregious infra-
structure problems within the court system, which undoubtedly had a 
negative impact on their clients.166 The building that housed the holding 
cells where in-custody defendants would be held while awaiting hear-
ings or trials had been condemned.167 When public defender’s had to 
bring clients to the courthouse, the defendants were held in a van in a 
yard outside the courthouse sometimes for hours at a time and with only 
portable lavatories available.168 To make matters worse, two jury delib-
eration rooms had windows that overlooked this lot and, if they wanted 
to, jurors could look out and see defendants shackled and in jail uni-
forms.169 These types of deficiencies negatively impact indigent defend-
ants because it is hard to get a fair trial if jurors are allowed to see you 
shackled and confined––it creates an unnecessary prejudice against the 
defendant.170  
Idaho counties that use a dedicated public defender office are sig-
nificantly out-numbered by counties that use other forms of indigent 
defense delivery services. The system most often implemented by Idaho 
counties is the contract system. 
2. Counties with the Contract System 
Currently, thirty-four counties in Idaho have opted for the contract 
system and have contracted with private attorneys for the delivery of 
indigent defense services.171 At the time of the Defender Association re-
port, Nez Perce County used flat-fee contracts for its indigent defense 
services.172 One law firm in Nez Perce County carried the contract and 
                                                       
164. Id. at 37. 
165. NLADA, supra note 7, at 37. Further, as recently as 2014, “four of the office’s 
[fifteen] attorneys handled well over 40 cases each, the bulk of which were felonies and mis-
demeanors. Another four defenders handled over 300 cases . . . including a mixture of felo-
nies, misdemeanors, juvenile cases, and other proceedings . . . . Such caseloads are well above 
national standards and impossible for one person to handle effectively.” Complaint, supra 
note 6, at 11. 
166. See NLADA, supra note 7, at 37.  
167. Id.  
168. Id.  
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Thomson, supra note 132, at 6. A more recent survey indicated that at least 
nineteen counties in Idaho continue to use a flat-fee contract system despite recent legisla-
tion that abolished the practice. Complaint, supra note 6 at 10. 
172. NLADA, supra note 7, at 10.  
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had the responsibility of selecting and paying conflict attorneys.173 There 
were no caseload standards in effect in the County and the law firm de-
cided how many attorneys to employ in order to provide defender ser-
vices without any government oversight.174 The firm also decided how 
many employees—including staff and administrators—to hire and how 
much to pay them.175 The only limitation the County imposed on the law 
firm is that it must have dedicated “a majority” of its time to indigent 
defense clients.176  
Fortunately, the County restricted the law firm from handling pri-
vate cases inside of Nez Perce County. However, the County did not re-
quire the law firm to report how many private cases it handled outside 
of the County, and it was completely up to the firm to decide if a case 
was conflicted.177 There were no oversight procedures in place so the 
County had no way to determine the overall quality of service it received 
for the contract price it paid to the law firm.178 Though the contract price 
of $440,000 seems high for a law firm with two partners handling all the 
County’s indigent defense services, the firm paid their one associate’s 
salary, expenses, and overhead with that amount.179 Thus, each attorney 
in the firm earned just above $61,000 per year for indigent defense rep-
resentation and that figure is reduced further by the cost of actual rep-
resentation such as experts, long-distance calls, investigations, and cop-
ies.180 
Even more troubling is that not only were the firm’s attorneys re-
sponsible for all standard felony, misdemeanor, and juvenile cases, they 
were also responsible for manning the County’s many problem solving 
courts such as drug court, mental health court, family reunification 
court, and DUI court.181 The associate attorney single-handedly staffed 
both the mental health court and the DUI court.182 It is estimated that 
the associate attorney handled over 1,100 cases in 2008.183 Of those cas-
es, approximately 900, were misdemeanor cases.184 The national stand-
ard for a single attorney is no more than 400 misdemeanor cases per 





177. Id. at 10–11. 
178. NLADA, supra note 7, at 10. 
179. Id. at 11–13.  
180. Id. at 13. 
181. Id. at 15. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 16.  
184. Id. 
690 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
year meaning that the associate handled the recommended workload of 
nearly three attorneys.185 
Additionally, Canyon County utilized a flat-fee contract with a pri-
vate law firm to provide all the County’s indigent defense services.186 
The annual contract price was $1,496,950 and the firm had total control 
over how to spend the money including how many attorneys it needed to 
employ to fulfill its contracted services.187 Also, the firm had to pay the 
sub-contracted conflict attorneys out of the contract price.188 Because the 
firm had to pay its conflict attorneys out of its own fee, there was a sig-
nificant incentive for the firm to misidentify conflicts in order to retain 
more of the contract price.189  
Also, an incentive existed to cut corners when it came to investiga-
tions.190 If an attorney working under the contract is unable to conduct 
his or her own investigation, the firm’s partners had to approve a re-
quest to hire an investigator.191 Since the compensation for the investi-
gator comes out of the contract price, there was an incentive for the 
partners to deny the request.192 The law firm also had no workload con-
trols for the amount of cases assigned to each individual attorney, thus 
several attorneys had caseloads double or triple the national stand-
ards.193 
In Power County, indigent defense services were contracted out to 
three individual attorneys.194 The system consisted of one primary con-
tract attorney, one conflict attorney, and one overflow attorney (not on a 
contract with the County).195 The previously elected prosecutor became a 
magistrate judge and had relationships with the criminal defense attor-
neys in the area.196 Because of these relationships, the County commis-
sioners sought the judge’s recommendations when it decided which de-
fense attorney should be awarded the indigent defense contract.197 Thus, 
the defender system in Power County is subject to political and judicial 
influence because the defense attorneys had an incentive to keep the 
                                                       
185. NLADA, supra note 7, at 16–17. 
186. Id. at 23. Canyon County now operates a dedicated public defender’s office. It 
began operation on October 1, 2014. Tera A. Harden, Public Defender, CANYON COUNTY 
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judge and commissioners happy instead of focusing on client representa-
tion.198 
The conflict defender was paid $16,800 per year and could take up 
to eight cases per month.199 So, if the conflict defender took on the max-
imum number of cases, he would be paid $175 per case no matter how 
serious the case,200 and that number is extremely low. The attorneys, 
and conflict attorneys, were also allowed to maintain a private prac-
tice.201 Additionally, there were no caseload limits and no caseload moni-
toring in Power County.202  
In addition to dedicated public defender offices and contract-based 
systems, judicial-assigned counsel is an indigent defense delivery option 
available to states and counties; however, Idaho’s legislature chose not 
to codify a judicial-assigned counsel system.203 And some Idaho counties 
use unique delivery systems not even available by statute.204 
3. Counties Using Other Systems 
Currently, there are two counties in Idaho that have opted to enter 
into agreements with neighboring counties to establish a joint public 
defender’s office.205 This joint office employs five full-time public defend-
ers and operates a small office in each of the two counties.206 This sys-
tem is unique because two counties pool their resources in order to pro-
vide indigent defense services.207 This joint public defender office system 
is statutorily acceptable under the Idaho Public Defense Act’s section 
two, but several counties throughout Idaho choose to operate under a 
system that is not defined in the Idaho Code.208 
For example, Washington County currently does not use any of the 
four systems identified by statute.209 Washington County has seven at-
torneys who are appointed by a judge on an as needed basis.210 Even 
though a judicial appointment delivery system is one that some states 
and counties can choose to implement, it is not allowed in Idaho.211 The 
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Idaho legislature, in drafting the statute, did not include a judicially 
appointed counsel delivery system as an option for Idaho counties.212 
This effectively means that Washington County is violating the stat-
ute.213 
According to the Defender Association’s report, Blaine County had 
one of the most unique systems of all the counties in Idaho.214 The Coun-
ty operated by awarding contracts to a set of private law firms, each one 
on a contract that rotated monthly.215 The County had contracted with 
five private law firms, and four sole practitioners.216 The attorneys de-
cided amongst themselves which months they would take throughout 
that year.217 This structure meant that all indigent defense cases that 
came through the County during a particular month would be assigned 
to that particular attorney or firm regardless of the attorney’s skill level 
or the case’s complexity.218 
In Blaine County, when a conflict arose, the case would be assigned 
to the “on call” attorney for the next month.219 The contract attorneys 
were allowed to maintain a private practice.220 In one particular firm, 
the average fee for indigent defense work was fifty dollars per hour 
whereas attorneys could charge up to $250 per hour to their private cli-
ents.221 This discrepancy alone incentivizes attorneys to spend more 
time on, and more zealously advocate for, private clients than public 
defense clients.222 
If the patchwork of County implemented systems seems chaotic, 
that’s because it is. And that is part of the problem. Many of the systems 
Idaho counties choose to implement are flawed in one way or another. 
These flaws include violations ranging from failing to protect a defend-
ant’s right to a fair trial to operating a system not defined by statute. 
But one thing is for sure: most Idaho indigent defense delivery systems 
result in violations of the ABA principles and are not meeting constitu-
tional minimums. 
B. Idaho’s Violations of the ABA Principles 
Many counties in Idaho are failing to meet constitutional mini-
mums for indigent defense and are violating the ABA’s principles for 
indigent defense delivery.223 Each county examined by the Defender’s 
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Association had multiple principle violations, which suggests that Ida-
ho’s defendants are not provided the foundational defense representa-
tion they are entitled to by the Constitution.224 Though Idaho’s systems 
violate all ten ABA principles in one way or another, the most egregious 
violations were abuses of principles 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10.  
1. Violations of ABA Principle 3 
The ABA’s principle 3 requires public defender systems to provide 
counsel to indigent defendants as soon as possible after arrest, deten-
tion, or request.225 This should occur within twenty-four hours.226 Early 
appointment of counsel ensures that the right to counsel at all critical 
stages of the prosecutorial process remains intact.227 Several counties in 
Idaho violated principle 3.228 
For example, in Bonneville County, a public defender was not pre-
sent in the courtroom as indigent defendants were meeting with a pros-
ecutor attempting to negotiate a plea deal.229 And no one in Bonneville 
County checked for probable cause for the initial arrests.230 Even long 
after the initial arrest, judges and public defenders were not present 
while prosecutors were striking plea deals with defendants.231  
Additionally, in Kootenai County, public defenders were not pre-
sent at first appearances.232 In one particular instance, a prosecutor 
stood before a group of defendants prior to an arraignment hearing with 
no judge or public defender present.233 The attorney said she would show 
a video explaining the defendant’s rights after they had met with the 
prosecutor and said that if the defendants wanted to speak with an at-
torney, they should hire one.234 The attorney did not mention the right 
to counsel if the defendants could not afford one.235 When one defendant 
asked if the plea deal the prosecutor offered him would disappear if he 
asked to talk to a lawyer, the prosecutor simply said she could not ad-
vise the defendant.236 This sequence happened in front of the other de-
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fendants making it likely that they too would be fearful of losing a de-
cent plea deal if they asked for counsel.237 
Similarly, in Nez Perce County, arraignments did not happen in 
the courtroom.238 Arraignments happened in front of the Clerk’s window 
where the defendant signed a waiver of rights form.239 A sign near the 
Clerk’s window read “[i]f you apply for a Public Defender and the service 
is granted to you IT IS NOT FREE! You may be required to reimburse 
Nez Perce County.”240 The defendant then waited to meet with the pros-
ecutor to negotiate a plea agreement without ever having a public de-
fender present to ensure the defendant’s rights are protected.241 By not 
requiring defense counsel present at arraignments, Nez Perce County 
violated the ABA’s principle 3.  
2. Violations of ABA Principle 4 and ABA Principle 7 
Many counties in Idaho did not have private meeting spaces at the 
courthouses or in the jails where attorneys could meet confidentially 
with their clients, which is a violation of principle 4.242 Private meeting 
spaces where attorneys and defendants can openly discuss the defend-
ants’ case are extremely important to preserving the defendant’s right to 
present a defense.243 Idaho counties violated defendants’ constitutional 
rights by making it difficult for these types of meetings to occur.244  
Additionally, many featured counties were in violation of the ABA’s 
principle 7, the requirement for vertical representation.245 Several coun-
ties in Idaho engage in horizontal representation.246 Horizontal repre-
sentation occurs when one attorney handles each separate part of a cli-
ent’s case like an assembly line; one attorney handles all arraignments, 
one attorney handles all trials, and so on.247 This horizontal representa-
tion system was used in Ada County and other public defender offices 
throughout Idaho meaning that indigent defendant’s in those counties 
are not benefitting from the continuity of communicating with one at-
torney throughout the entire process.248 
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3. Violations of ABA Principle 6 and ABA Principle 9 
The ABA’s principles 6 and 9 are linked.249 Principle 6 requires that 
an attorney’s experience, training, and ability be matched with the 
case’s complexity.250 And principle 9 requires that public defenders at-
tend continuing legal education, thus, enhancing the training and abil-
ity required by principle 6.251 Counties in Idaho are violating these two 
principles.  
For example, while Ada County was commendable on its system of 
dividing public defenders and staff into teams based on experience, its 
lack of training available was a problem because in-house training was 
“virtually non-existent.”252 The same was true in Power County. The 
County imposed no training requirements on its contract defenders and 
offered no reimbursement for training.253 Thus, the contract defenders 
simply met the minimum requirements imposed on them by the state 
bar association and many chose the least expensive classes, which they 
paid for out of their own pockets.254 These principle violations hurt indi-
gent defendants who need trained, experienced, and qualified attorneys 
to represent them. 
4. Violations of ABA Principle 10 
Lastly, many Idaho counties failed to meet the ABA’s principle 10 
requirements.255 Principle 10 requires that all defense attorneys are 
“supervised and systematically reviewed for quality and efficiency” and 
many Idaho counties failed to supervise and review indigent defense 
attorneys for effectiveness.256  
For example, while the Kootenai County office was large enough to 
require mid-level supervising attorneys, the evaluation and review of 
attorneys was informal and inadequate as none of the attorneys were 
evaluated annually.257 The same lack of supervision and evaluation 
standards were reported in Bonneville County, Blaine County, and Nez 
Perce County.258 For instance, Bonneville County had no policies on min-
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imum attorney qualifications and even one felony attorney said no one 
helped him on his first trial, nor did anyone supervise him in court.259 
These violations mean that Idaho defense attorneys are allowed to grow 
complacent or are unknowingly making errors that no one is correcting. 
Therefore, Idaho defendants may not be getting the representation they 
desperately need. 
Even with the understanding of the egregious principle violations 
just described, because of Idaho’s unique differences from county-to-
county, there is no single best “cookie-cutter” public defense delivery 
system according to the Defender Association.260  
However, “there are two primary factors that determine the ade-
quacy of indigent defense services provided: (a) the degree and sufficien-
cy of state funding and structure, and (b) compliance with nationally 
recognized standards of justice. So long as these two goals are met, Ida-
ho policy-makers will have remedied the crisis.”261 
The Defender Association hoped its report would force legislators to 
take a closer look at the present system and see its constitutional inade-
quacies and that change would come before a class action lawsuit.262 
However so far, even with the two new legislative “patches,” none of the 
changes have proven to be enough to push Idaho in the right direction. 
C. A Cosmetic Patch: A Critical Examination of Idaho’s Recent 
Legislative Attempt at Structural Repair 
Recently, Idaho Legislators seem to be listening to the demands of 
indigent defense providers and passed legislation aimed at initiating 
reform, but it is not enough.263 For instance, the House of Representa-
tives passed resolutions creating a committee to determine the best way 
to implement state oversight of indigent defense.264 The resolutions also 
acknowledged that Idaho’s delivery of right to counsel services lacked 
uniformity in caseload requirements, in appointment of counsel practic-
es, and in training.265 The Committee studied two different state-
managed indigent defense delivery models: (1) a county operated sys-
tem––similar to the current system where counties can choose their de-
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livery method––but with a state-oversight commission that promulgates 
rules and enforces standards, and (2) a state-financed and managed sys-
tem where all counties would be required to maintain a dedicated public 
defender office.266  
Most recently, the Committee voted against a resolution that would 
have placed the responsibility on the State to assign public defenders 
finding that county officials have the local expertise to deal with these 
types of issues––at least according to one committee member.267 This 
meant that individual counties were still responsible for indigent de-
fense.268  
During one of the Committee’s meetings, the Idaho Supreme 
Court’s Chief Justice stated that he supported the key areas of study 
including: “[t]he structure and organization of how Idaho will deliver its 
system of public defense; [h]ow the system will be held accountable; 
[t]he standards and funding for training; and [h]ow best to provide on-
going and stable funding to support Idaho’s system of indigent de-
fense.”269 The Chief Justice asked the Committee to look at specific prob-
lems throughout Idaho including workload standards, training for at-
torneys, and recruitment of qualified, experienced attorneys. He also 
asked the Committee to recommend to the legislature that flat-fee con-
tracts be eradicated.270 
The Chief Justice’s comments are unique. It is a rare situation for a 
potential litigant or lawyer to receive insight on how a judge would rule 
on a particular issue. The Committee received that gift in the Chief Jus-
tice’s comments. A Justice on a Supreme Court is the final arbiter of 
these types of issues and if he is recognizing the problem, it means there 
is a problem. If Idaho doesn’t soon fix its problems, it could end up on 
the wrong side of a final decision. 
In March 2014, the governor of Idaho signed House Bill 542 into 
law.271 The law (1) prohibited the use of flat-fee contracts by Idaho’s 
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counties, and (2) created the Idaho Public Defense Commission.272 While 
these legislative measures appear to be a step in the right direction for 
Idaho, they equate to a shiny new coat of paint on Idaho’s public defense 
system.273 But this cosmetic touch-up does not repair the underlying 
problem––Idaho’s crumbling indigent defense foundation. 
1. Abolishment of Flat-Fee Contracts 
Flat-fee contracts are prohibited under the ABA’s principle 8.274 
The use of flat-fee contracts is problematic because the contracts en-
courage governments to contract with the lowest bidder of indigent de-
fense services.275 There are also implicit incentives for attorneys to do 
less.276 For example, attorneys on flat-fee contracts get paid one flat rate 
for an unlimited number of cases and are not reimbursed for litigation-
related expenses.277 Thus, the more work an attorney does on a case, the 
less he gets paid, so there are financial motivations to spend less time 
with each client than if an attorney was being paid by the hour.278  
In 2014, the Idaho Legislature banned the use of flat-fee contracts 
for indigent defense services.279 The result was that counties could con-
tract with a defense attorney for indigent defense services as long as the 
county abided by the following provision: “the terms of the contract shall 
not include any pricing structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee 
for the services and expenses of the attorney.”280 This provision allows 
counties to continue to provide indigent defense services through con-
tract attorneys as long as the county is not paying the flat-fee contract 
attorneys one flat rate, which includes the attorney’s expenses.281 
At first glance, this legislation makes it seem like the Idaho Legis-
lature is being proactive about providing indigent defendants with a 
greater level of Sixth Amendment protections.282 However, the statute 
may be flawed in the way it was written, allowing counties to find a 
loophole that allows them to continue providing flat-fee services,283 
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which are popular with flat-fee attorneys.284 The statute uses the word 
and: “single fixed fee for the services and expenses.”285 The word “and” is 
a conjunctive connector meaning that it links two words or clauses and 
gives the clauses equal weight in the sentence.286 Thus, it appears from 
the statute’s plain meaning that the drafters meant to abolish only 
those contracts that are inclusive of both the attorney’s fee for services 
and the attorney’s expenses.287 A contract price that excludes expenses 
may not be in violation of the statute.288 
Counties are taking advantage of the statute’s loophole.289 Counties 
have interpreted the statute to mean that if a county agrees to pay an 
attorney a flat-fee but then pays for her expenses separately, it is not in 
violation of the statute.290 At least for the time being, it will be difficult 
to determine if counties are actually following the statute, but it appears 
that these types of contracts are still being used in counties throughout 
Idaho.291 Moreover, it is not hard to imagine that once counties following 
the statute discover that its neighboring counties are using this loop-
hole, they may choose to return to their bad behavior and abandon the 
progress they have made.292 There appears to be major problems with 
the way the legislation was drafted, causing the statute to do little for 
indigent defense services in Idaho.  
2. Idaho Public Defense Commission 
The creation of the Public Defense Commission (Commission) also 
does little to improve indigent defense services in Idaho as it violates 
principle 1. The Commission is responsible for and has the authority to 
provide training, to implement performance standards, and to set up a 
system for data collection.293 However, just creating the Commission 
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does not mean that Idaho’s indigent defense problems disappear.294 The 
Commission’s powers and functionalities are flawed in three ways: (1) 
the Commission is not independent from judicial and political influence, 
(2) while the Commission has the power to create rules about the collec-
tion of data, it has no power to actually collect the data, and (3) the 
Commission has no power to enforce the rules and standards it cre-
ates.295 
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  In January 2016, the Public Defense Reform Interim Committee signed off on a 
“draft bill that would give the Public Defense Commission the power to set public defense 
standards, provide training[,] and give out grant money to counties to help them comply.” 
Nathan Brown, Public Defense Commission Signs Off on Draft Bill, MAGICVALLEY.COM (Feb. 
9, 2016), http://magicvalley.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/public-defense-commission-
signs-off-on-draft-bill/article_76166c29-5d21-5c58-8e4d-22a03a1c63f9.html. However, re-
garding the Commission’s enforcement capabilities, the draft bill proposes that the Com-
misison first try to mediate if a county is not following the Commission’s standards. Id. And 
only when mediation fails will the State step in and pay to fix the problem—a cost that will 
eventually have to be repaid by the county. Id. Additionally, regarding funding, the commit-
tee is recomending that $5.5 million go to providing grants to counties and paying the Com-
mission’s employees. Id. But even before the Commission’s employees are paid, the grant 
money only leaves an average of $125,000 per county to supplement the current indigent 
defense deficiences. Five and a half million dollars is simply not enough to fix Idaho’s indi-
gent defense problems. 
  As an update, “[o]n March 22, 2016, a $5.4 million appropriations bill was 
passed authorizing the [Idaho State Public Defense Commission], in part, to disseminate 
$4,266,500 in grants to counties to offset the cost of compliance with indigent defense stand-
ards. This bill passed both chambers unanimously . . . . Another $550,000 was appropriated 
to encourage counties to merge trial-level services into regional systems, and $250,000 is 
available to assist counties with extraordinary litigation costs. The balance of $416,300 funds 
an expansion of [Commission] staff and associated overhead costs. David Carroll, Idaho Em-
powers State Commission with New Authorities and New Funding, SIXTH AMENDMENT 
CENTER (Mar. 23, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/idaho-empowers-state-commission-with-
new-authorities-and-new-funding/. 
294. Carroll, supra note 9. The Public Defense Reform Interim Committee proposed 
the legislation that created the Commission and the Committee’s concern was that it would 
take at least a year for the commission to be up and running. Here is the good news: the 
Commission has been established and has started to make recommendations to the Legisla-
ture.  
295. See IDAHO CODE § 19-849–850(1)(a) (2012). According to Idaho Code §19-849: 
 
(1) There is hereby created in the department of self-governing agencies the state 
public defense commission. The commission shall consist of seven (7) members 
as follows: 
(a) Two (2) representatives from the state legislature that shall include one (1) 
member from the senate and one (1) member from the house of representatives; 
(b) One (1) representative appointed by the chief justice of the Idaho supreme 
court; and 
(c) Four (4) representatives appointed by the governor and confirmed by the sen-
ate as follows: 
(i) One (1) representative from the Idaho association of counties; 
(ii) One (1) representative who has experience as a defending attorney; 
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Pursuant to the statute’s language, the Commission’s first flaw is 
that it violates principle 1.296 A successful oversight commission needs to 
be able to assure quality indigent defense representation throughout the 
state and must be independent from political and judicial influence.297 In 
Idaho, the Commission includes seven members.298 Two members are 
appointed by the Legislature (one from the House of Representatives 
and one from the Senate) and it is likely that these appointments have 
political affiliations.299 Additionally, Idaho Supreme Court’s Chief Jus-
tice appoints one of the seven Commission members.300 And the Gover-
nor, who has a political affiliation, appoints four of the Commission’s 
seven members.301 These appointments are likely to be influenced by 
strong party affiliations.302 It is also likely that the appointments are 
heavily influence by people with robust connections to power and poli-
tics. Therefore, the Legislature violated the first principle’s requirement 
that public defense systems be free from political influence or judicial 
oversight when it created the Commission.303 
Consequently, the Commission, serving as overseer of the public 
defense function in Idaho, is not independent from political influence 
and judicial oversight. And because appointments come from all three 
branches of government, it appears the statute was designed so that the 
Commission is accountable to not a single branch of government but 
then all of them at the same time.304 This set up causes two problems. 
First, if the Commission is not accountable to a single branch of gov-
ernment, then the Commission may choose to implement indigent de-
                                                                                                                                
 
According to Idaho Code § 19-850: 
 
(1) The state public defense commission shall: 
(a) Promulgate rules in accordance with the provisions of chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code, establishing the following: 
(i) Training and continuing legal education requirements for defending attor-
neys, which shall promote competency and consistency in case types including, 
but not limited to, criminal, juvenile, abuse and neglect, post-conviction, civil 
commitment, capital and civil contempt; and 
(ii) Uniform data reporting requirements for the annual reports submitted pur-
suant to section 19-864, Idaho Code. The data reported shall include caseload, 
workload and expenditures. . . .  
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fense changes not endorsed by any governmental branch. Second, if the 
Commission is accountable to all three branches of government at the 
same time, this likely will result in political gridlock where the Commis-
sion will be stalled from advancing any meaningful change. Accordingly, 
when the Legislature drafted the statute creating the Commission, it 
did not heed political independence recommendations.305 
Second, the Commission is flawed because its power is empty.306 
The Commission’s only two objectives are to promulgate rules for train-
ing and legal education for public defenders and to create rules for uni-
form data reporting requirements annual reports.307 But––despite the 
power to create rules for data reporting––the Commission has no power 
to collect the data.308  
Promulgating rules for data collection is a nice start for indigent 
defense reform in Idaho.309 But until the Legislature gives the Commis-
sion the power and budget to collect the data, the Commission will have 
a hard time collecting the data it needs to convince the Legislature that 
drastic changes are needed in Idaho’s indigent defense delivery sys-
tem.310  
Even if the Commission had the power to collect meaningful data, 
the Commission doesn’t have enough money.311 The Commission’s work-
ing budget is approximately $100,000.312 These resources are not enough 
for the Commission to even begin the process of collecting critical data 
on Idaho’s indigent defense––assuming the Legislature gave the Com-
mission any power to do anything besides promulgate rules. The ability 
to collect and analyze data is the most important and fundamental role 
of a commission such as this one.313 Collecting essential data is only the 
first step in a long line of steps towards indigent defense improvement. 
If the Commission doesn’t have the resources to collect the data, it sure-
ly won’t be able to analyze the data and turn that data into vital sugges-
tions for indigent defense system reform. 
However, as strange as it seems, even when the Commission does 
promulgate and implement rules regarding training, education, and da-
ta collection, the Legislature gave it no power to enforce those rules.314 
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The statute gives the Commission power to create rules but leaves it 
with no statutory enforcement mechanism.315 This essentially creates a 
Commission that is devoid of holding anyone who violates its rules ac-
countable.316 
The Public Defense Commission’s third flaw is that it violates prin-
ciple 4 and 5. The Legislature gave the Commission no power to imple-
ment any national standards of public defense delivery systems.317 For 
example, the Commission is unable to set workload standards and limits 
recommended by ABA principle 5 and desperately needed by Idaho’s 
overworked public defenders.318 Additionally, the statute gives no power 
for the Commission to create rules and regulations for ensuring that 
public defenders are provided with confidential and private meeting 
spaces for client meetings, which is recommended by principle 4, and a 
problem occurring in many of Idaho’s courthouses.319  
Even with its flaws, the Commission is a step in the right direction 
for indigent defense reform in Idaho, but the Legislature has a long way 
to go before the steps it has taken will begin to effect meaningful change 
for Idaho’s indigent defendants. First, the Commission needs to comply 
with the ABA’s principles for indigent defense delivery systems. Next, 
the Legislature needs to supply the Commission with more money, more 
people, and more power so that it can collect the necessary data and an-
alyze that data to help best effectuate indigent defense reform in Idaho. 
Even though home makeover shows give the impression that homes can 
be built (or re-built) within a matter of days, a structurally sound house 
can’t be built overnight. It requires money, people, and power.  
IV. RECONSTRUCTING A SOLID FOUNDATION: IDAHO’S NEED 
FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE REFORM 
All three branches of Idaho’s government have recognized that the 
current indigent defense system is broken.320 But while all three see the 
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problem––and one branch has taken small steps toward fixing it––none 
is doing enough.  
What they are doing, at least, is talking about the crisis. For exam-
ple, in January 2015, the Governor delivered his State of the State and 
Budget Address.321 In that Address, he acknowledged the importance of 
overhauling Idaho’s public defender system: 
The courts have made it clear that our current method of provid-
ing legal counsel for indigent criminal defendants does not pass 
constitutional muster. This is a priority for our counties so it al-
so must be a priority for us. If we value the ideals embodied in 
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eighth amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution, then it is undeniably our responsibility to take the 
phrase “due process of law” as seriously as the Framers intend-
ed.322 
As support for Idaho’s serious new stance, and in acknowledgement of 
each branch’s inherent role in tripartite government, the Governor 
called the Legislature to action: he encouraged legislators to create 
meaningful change by continuing the reform efforts.323  
After such a long period of inaction, the Governor’s words are prom-
ising. But they are incomplete. This could be in part because the Execu-
tive Branch is generally limited to enforcing the Legislature’s laws, 
which means that the Executive Branch must wait for those laws to ex-
ist. But in the meantime, the Executive Branch could do more than talk. 
It could act. It could—perhaps by proposing practical steps for meaning-
ful reform—help the Legislature do its job, which would bring Idaho 
closer to fulfilling its responsibility to offer adequate due process. How-
ever, those sorts of specific suggestions have yet to come.324 
Possibly because of its particular expertise, Idaho’s Judicial Branch 
identified the need for monumental change to the State’s public defense 
system a little earlier than the Executive Branch did.325 More than a 
year before the Governor addressed the crisis in his annual remarks, the 
Chief Justice of the Idaho Supreme Court noted the State’s long history 
of safeguarding indigent defense:  
[S]ince 1923 Idahoans have had the right for every “reasonable 
opportunity” to prepare a defense. This starts with time––time 
to interview, investigate and prepare legal arguments. All of 
Idaho public defense attorneys do not have that time. Appropri-
ate caseload numbers exist from state and national organiza-
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tions. These should be closely examined by the interim commit-
tee and made enforceable. Every reasonable opportunity for a 
fair and impartial trial should include competent attorneys who 
are trained and have an experience level commensurate with the 
case or crime. . . . It has been the duty of this state before state-
hood and continues today. It is our duty to protect these funda-
mental ideals for the future.326 
The Judicial Branch’s well-established role as interpreter of the 
law gives it a good platform from which to protect those ideals.327 As the 
branch invested with the authority to say what the law is, the judiciary 
could move indigent defense reform forward through precedential rul-
ings.328 And judicial guidance would be welcome, especially because “the 
legislature has been on notice for years and has failed to act. . . .”329 
But the Judicial Branch has more to offer than just legal interpre-
tation. In Idaho, it is also responsible for supervising attorneys.330 Under 
that part of its power, the judiciary could promulgate rules requiring 
stricter adherence to model indigent defense standards.331 Those rules—
which could, for instance, cap public defenders’ caseloads—would benefit 
both the overburdened lawyers and the clients they serve.332 
Though the judiciary can help remedy the problem, both by inter-
preting existing laws and by creating attorney rules in the same spirit, 
its power is limited.333 Judges can interpret only those laws the Legisla-
ture creates.334 Thus, given its traditional role as the architect of laws, 
the Legislature is actually in the prime position to fix Idaho’s system. 
And it has tried. The legislative branch is currently the only one of 
the three to have gone beyond conversation and into action.335 Recogniz-
ing the need for indigent defense reform, the Legislature created the 
Public Defense Interim Committee in 2013.336 As noted earlier, the 
Committee quickly proposed two pieces of legislation, both aimed at im-
proving the system in Idaho.337 The legislation passed in 2014.338  
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Despite the Legislature’s efforts, the recent statutes are not likely 
to do much to advance indigent defense reform.339 Although the statutes 
show that the Legislature is aware of the problem and is trying to cor-
rect it, the new laws do not achieve the critical reform Idaho needs.340 
Maybe that’s because new isn’t always better—especially when there is 
a pre-existing blueprint for constructing an ideal indigent defense deliv-
ery system.341 
Instead of trying to make something from nothing, the Legislature 
could look for guidance to the design the ABA has already drawn up; it 
could codify the ten principles of a constitutional indigent defense deliv-
ery system.342 While that is not the only approach Idaho could take, it is 
one way the legislative branch could produce sustainable reform. But 
whatever option it chooses, Idaho should pick quickly: litigation against 
the State has arrived. 
A. Idaho’s Third-Generation Litigation 
At the end of its 2015 Legislative session, Idaho again failed to 
fund or improve its indigent defense system.343 Because of that failure, a 
class-action civil rights lawsuit on this issue was filed on June 17, 
2015.344 As one of three remaining states not providing state-funded in-
digent defense, Idaho was at particular risk of being sued by a watchdog 
group aiming to force the State to change its ways.345 Idaho is out of 
time to change its ways as the ACLU, ACLU of Idaho, and the global 
law firm Hogan Lovells filed a lawsuit on behalf of defendants who were 
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deprived constitutionally adequate representation in Idaho.346 Lawsuits 
of this type—called third-generation indigent defense litigation—have 
been successful in other jurisdictions as a last resort for reform.347 
In fact, one of the earliest examples of a successful third-generation 
lawsuit targeted Idaho’s eastern neighbor, Montana. Before the lawsuit, 
which the ACLU initiated in 2002, Montana’s indigent defense system 
was a mixed bag of private contract attorneys, county-employed defend-
ers, and judge-appointed private attorneys.348 Even employing all of 
those methods of delivering indigent defense services, however, the 
State was failing to fulfill its duty to provide adequate counsel.349 
In response to widespread dissatisfaction with Montana’s patch-
work, county-operated system—which often led to disparities in the 
quality of representation from county to county—the ACLU filed a law-
suit in 2002 against seven counties in Montana.350 That lawsuit chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the State’s indigent defense system and 
sought to reform it.351 Although Montana courts were not forced to re-
solve the litigation because the Legislature acted before the end of the 
litigation, the ACLU lawsuit is often cited as the catalyst for change 
that prompted Montana to reform its ailing indigent defense system.352  
That reformation came in 2005, when the Montana Legislature 
passed the Montana Public Defender Act.353 The Act created a state-
wide public defense system, which completely overhauled the old coun-
ty-operated system.354 Montana’s new system included a state oversight 
commission, ensured that adequate funding for indigent defense was 
provided by the state, and included an office of the state public defender, 
which prepared regional plans and caseload management programs.355 
Legal experts, including the ACLU of Idaho (the group that is per-
haps best suited to know), have been warning Idaho legislators since the 
2010 Defender Association’s report that the State’s current public de-
                                                       
346. Leo Morales, ACLU Sues Idaho over Defective Public Defense System (June 17, 
2015), http://acluidaho.org/aclu-sues-idaho-over-defective-public-defense-system/. 
347. Id. at 73 (“If policy makers are unable or unwilling to address systematic con-
cerns with Idaho’s indigent defense system, litigation could be considered as a last resort.”). 
348. Jessa DeSimone, Bucking Conventional Wisdom: The Montana Public Defender 
Act, 96 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1479, 1494–95 (2006). 
349. Id. at 1498. 
350. Id. at 1498–99. 
351. ACLU OF MONTANA, MONTANA’S PUBLIC DEFENSE SYSTEM: AN EVALUATION 
FIVE YEARS INTO THE STATEWIDE SYSTEM 3 (2011), 
http://publicdefender.mt.gov/forms/pdf/ACLUmontanaopdreport.pdf; DeSimone, supra note 
348, at 1498. 
352. DeSimone, supra note 348, at 1498. 
353. Id. at 1504. 
354. Id. 
355. Id. at 1505–07. 
708 IDAHO LAW REVIEW VOL. 52 
 
fense system could be ripe for litigation.356 The day has come. Litigation 
against Idaho is now pending, which shows that such warnings should 
not have been taken lightly. As Montana’s experience shows, lawsuits 
brought on behalf of indigent defendants, especially lawsuits with the 
backing of national organizations like the ACLU, can trigger needed 
change, but they do so at a high cost. Third-generation litigation is ex-
pensive.357  
Now that a lawsuit has been initiated against the state, Idaho will 
of course have to spend money litigating the lawsuit.358 And that ex-
penditure is in addition to the cost of making the necessary systemic 
changes themselves.359 Idaho would certainly have saved money if it 
took action before being forced. But by failing to move toward meaning-
ful reform before the ACLU commenced its litigation, Idaho now has to 
spend the money on defending a lawsuit instead of on something of real 
value: a systematic public defense program that has the necessary fund-
ing, is properly administered, and divides resources evenly among the 
prosecution and defense functions.360  
B. Codifying the Ten ABA Principles 
Idaho does not have to wait for a lawsuit to arrive to get some help 
identifying how to improve its system. The template for a functioning 
model exists outside of a Complaint’s demands. To build a constitutional 
foundation for delivering indigent defense services, Idaho needs only to 
look to the ABA’s ten principles.361 Codifying those principles as part of 
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a statewide oversight system would put Idaho one step closer to sus-
tainable indigent defense reform.362  
As discussed in Part II.C.2, each of the ten principles represents 
one facet of a structurally sound public defense delivery system.363 With 
each principle it codifies, then, Idaho adds one support beam to a badly 
decaying infrastructure. If, for example, Idaho were to adopt Principles 
2 and 5, which are aimed at caseload control, individual public defend-
ers could provide better representation because workload caps would 
give them more time with each defendant.364 Codification of Principle 4 
would give each defendant a private space in which to meet with his at-
torney, a critical component to preserving the client’s right to confiden-
tiality and encouraging him to participate in his own defense.365 And, 
maybe most importantly for the defendants themselves (and for ful-
filling Gideon’s promise), adopting Principle 3 would ensure that every 
defendant is promptly appointed an attorney, regardless of his ability to 
pay for one.366  
Codified together, the ABA’s ten principles would provide Idaho a 
strong foundation for indigent defense delivery. But, as structurally 
necessary as they are, the principles are actually only constitutional 
minimums.367 States can do more. If Idaho chooses to lay the ground-
work for solid and lasting indigent defense reform with the ABA princi-
ples, it can then build on top of that base by removing the responsibility 
of indigent defense services from counties, where it currently resides. To 
finish the job—and ensure once and for all that defendants are afforded 
their Sixth Amendment right to counsel—Idaho should take responsibil-
ity back from its counties and provide financing, oversight and county-
operated public defender offices. 
C. State-managed, County-operated Dedicated Public Defender Offices 
On average, each state in this country spends $11.86 per person on 
indigent defense.368 By contrast, Idaho spends only $7.83—more than 
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four dollars less per person than the national average.369 In fact, Idaho 
has one of the lowest state indigent defense expenditures in the country, 
ranking forty-second out of fifty.370 Idaho also falls well below the na-
tional average on per-capita spending on indigent defense, with a simi-
larly dismal ranking of forty-second out of fifty.371  
These numbers do not have to be the end of the story for Idaho, 
though. Other states have seen improvement in both raw numbers and 
ranking as they have transitioned to providing state-based indigent de-
fense services.372 Idaho could follow a similar trajectory if it creates a 
state-based system instead of continuing on with its county-operated 
system.373 
Support for such an idea is both statewide and national. Many or-
ganizations and entities are currently pushing for exactly this kind of 
public defense reform.374 Recently, for example, individual counties 
joined together in an attempt to convince the State Legislature that re-
form is desperately needed in Idaho.375  
In September 2014, County officials from across the State gathered 
at the Idaho Association of Counties Convention.376 There, officials made 
clear that indigent defense reform was one of the County Association’s 
priorities and suggested that the State should take over control of indi-
gent defense rather than leaving the burden on individual counties.377 
One County even proposed a resolution that would have accomplished 
exactly that, giving the State government responsibility for overseeing 
and implementing a state public defender system.378 The County Associ-
ation approved the resolution,379 but the Idaho Public Defense Reform 
Interim Committee voted against it in November 2014.380 As a result of 
the Committee’s de facto veto, individual counties remain in control of 
indigent defense in Idaho.381 
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This development is disheartening because a radical departure 
from the current county-operated system would do Idaho good.382 As the 
County Association’s resolution recognized, a district-wide office with 
state oversight deserves consideration from state legislators.383 It is true 
that there are several models available to reformers trying to design a 
new indigent defense delivery system;384 but of these options, a state 
oversight system best protects a defendant’s constitutional right to 
counsel.385 A state-managed system is best because it could potentially 
provide uniform practice standards, uniform hiring guidelines, and uni-
form budgetary controls for county-operated offices. Because it is best, 
Idaho should implement a state-managed system that provides for coun-
ty-operated dedicated public defender offices. Doing so will ensure that, 
as Idaho fixes the footing of its indigent defense system, it constructs a 
durable, high-quality structure atop that base. 
Aside from assuring that Idaho’s future indigent defense delivery 
system is built to last, creating a state-managed, county-operated model 
has another benefit: it most closely tracks recent guidance from the fed-
eral government about how to safeguard the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.386 Last year, in the course of third-generation litigation in New 
York state court, the U.S. Attorney General submitted a Statement of 
Interest outlining the federal government’s views on public defense re-
form.387 Interestingly, the Attorney General chose to comment in a case 
challenging a system that looks very much like the one currently in ef-
fect in Idaho; the New York lawsuit alleged that the State’s public de-
fender system, which the State conferred upon the counties, resulted in 
inadequate representation for indigent defendants.388 
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The Attorney General’s Statement in the New York case was nota-
ble, as it marked the first time the U.S. Department of Justice has ex-
pressed in state court its opinion about how states provide indigent de-
fense.389 The Statement proposed that states be held accountable––by 
third-generation lawsuits or federal government intervention––if they 
fail to provide adequate legal services to indigent people accused of 
crimes.390 And after taking such an unprecedented step to add the fed-
eral government’s voice to the dialogue about state public defense sys-
tems, the Attorney General did not mince words: 
The United States has an interest in ensuring that all jurisdic-
tions—federal, state, and local—are fulfilling their obligation 
under the Constitution to provide effective assistance of counsel 
to individuals facing criminal charges who cannot afford an at-
torney, as required by Gideon. . . . It’s time to reclaim Gideon’s 
petition—and resolve to confront the obstacles facing indigent 
defense providers.391  
Thus, it appears that even the Department of Justice—recognizing the 
country’s deficiencies in indigent defense and reflecting its natural in-
clination to protect constitutional rights—has identified a state-
managed system based on ABA principles as the best solution to the 
problem.392 
Whatever else it does, the federal government’s position definitely 
reflects one particular understanding: without guidance from the state, 
counties will continue, inadvertently or intentionally, to neglect their 
obligations to provide defendants with the counsel they are constitu-
tionally guaranteed.393 Unless Idaho wants to be next on the Attorney 
General’s radar, it needs to engage in an indigent defense delivery sys-
tem overhaul and reassume its constitutional responsibility.394  
                                                       
389. Id. The Attorney General had previously submitted a Statement of Interest in 
federal court in 2013. See generally Statement of Interest of the United States, Wilbur v. City 
of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d. 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (No. C11-1100RSL). 
390. Settlement, supra note 385. 
391. Hurrell-Harring, supra note 386, at 2. 
392. See generally id. 
393. NLADA, supra note 7, at 52. 
394. Idaho is too late. The Department of Justice’s interest in Idaho’s deficiencies is 
now evident. In April, 2016, (as this article was in its final stages of editing) the DOJ “moved 
for permission from the Idaho Supreme Court to file an amicus brief supporting the ACLU. . . 
. In support of its motion, the [DOJ] cited ‘the United States’ strong interest in ensuring that 
indigent criminal defendnts receive the full measure of rights the constitution guarantees, as 
well as its practical expertise in access-to-justice issues.’” See Motion for Leave to File Brief 
as Amicus Curiae, Tucker v. Idaho, No. 43922-2016 (Idaho Apr. 29, 2016), 
https://idreports.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/2016-04-29-supp-mot-for-brief-amicus-
curiae.pdf; Defendants-Respondents’ Response to United States of America’s Motion for 
Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae, Tucker v. Idaho, NO. 43922-2016 (Idaho Apr. 28, 
2016), https://idreports.files.wordpress.com/2016/05/tucker-v-state-of-idaho-defendents-
brief.pdf; see also Sam Wright, Public Defender Roundup, ABOVE THE LAW (May 10, 2016), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/05/public-defender-roundup/. 
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Even the leading experts in indigent defense reform are not sure 
what that overhaul looks like for Idaho.395 But what is clear is that the 
most recent steps are not enough. Because “[t]he state is obliged to en-
sure that the counties are capable of meeting [Gideon’s] obligations and 
that counties actually do so,” Idaho must act now.396 As “the original ob-
ligor,” Idaho must step in and succeed where its counties have failed.397 
Idaho must create a state-managed, county-operated network of dedi-
cated public defender offices. 
State funding for county-operated dedicated public defender offices 
is the best delivery method for protecting indigent defendant’s constitu-
tional rights in Idaho. To employ this system, the Legislature could 
begin the renovation by codifying the ABA’s ten principles. Additionally, 
the Legislature could give the existing Commission the power to create a 
public defender hiring agency, which could create guidelines for hiring 
government employees that meet certain industry standards. And to 
achieve systemic quality representation, the Commission could provide 
those defenders with training, guidance, operating manuals, and infor-
mation on best practices. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Forty states throughout the country currently have some form of 
state oversight of their indigent defense delivery system.398 It is time for 
Idaho to join them. Doing so will allow Idaho to rebuild a solid structure 
where one is presently rotting away. 
Indigent defendants in Idaho need public defense reform now. They 
are the ones paying the highest price because of Idaho’s crumbling foun-
dation. A person stands to lose his liberty, or even his life, when indi-
gent defense delivery systems are insufficient.399 If defendants do not 
have adequate representation, it can be, literally, a matter of life and 
death.400  
Idaho’s recent past is riddled with constitutional violations that 
need immediate, reconstructive attention. If meaningful indigent de-
fense reform does not arrive in Idaho soon, the State’s government offi-
cials risk costly third-generation litigation. These lawsuits will come 
even though “Idaho’s public defenders are not bad lawyers—they’ve 
                                                       
395. See generally Hoskins, supra note 305. 
396. Id. at 6. 
397. See id. 
398. Hoskins, supra note 305. 
399. Ritchie Eppink, “The Joke’s On Us”: Pausing to Reflect on the 50th Anniversary 
of Gideon v. Wainwright, Vol. 56, THE ADVOCATE at 18 (Jan. 2013), 
https://isb.idaho.gov/pdf/advocate/issues/adv13jan.pdf. 
400. See id. 
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simply been given the impossible task of representing too many clients 
with too few resources.”401 
But as distressing as the ramifications will be for Idaho officials, 
maintaining the status quo will have an even more devastating impact 
on Idaho’s indigent defendants. If Idaho continues trying to fix a struc-
tural problem with cosmetic touch-ups—or trying to build a new frame-
work without first laying the proper foundation—its indigent defense 
system will, before long, come crashing down on top of it.402  

















                                                       
401. Id. 
402. See MACHIAVELLI, supra note 1, at 79 (“He who has not first laid his founda-
tions may be able with great ability to lay them afterwards, but they will be laid with trouble 
to the architect and danger to the building.”). 
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